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The Use Of Arbitration In Director and Officer
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ROBERT A. WELLS
"He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The indemnification of corporate directors and officers is universally
accepted as an important element of corporate governance. 2 Director and
officer indemnification provides reimbursement to the indemnified party
from its corporate employer for liabilities, including amounts incurred
because of adverse judgments, settlement payments, attorney's fees and
other legal expenses arising out of their service to the corporation. 3
Corporate director and officer indemnification has been a prominent
part of corporate governance for over fifty years in an effort to encourage
qualified and talented individuals to serve as directors and officers without
the fear of personal legal liability for their corporate decisions. 4 Inevitably,
1 SuN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 17 (James Clavell ed., Dell Publishing 1988).
2 All 50 states have statutes that allow for the indemnification of corporate directors
and officers. See WILIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABIuTY OF CORPORATE
OEPIcERs AND DmEcToRs 497-499 (Cum. Supp. 1996).
3 See Dennis J. Block et al., Indemnification and Insurance of Corporate Officials,
623 PLI/Comm. 403, 412 (1992).
In addition to corporate directors and officers, in most jurisdictions, even other
employees or agents may seek corporate indemnification for legal expenses they incur
because of their official actions. See id.
4 See, e.g., 2 WILAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIAmLITY OF CORPORATE
OFFicERs AND DREcToRs 282 (5th ed. 1993). A 1941 New Jersey court stated that
indemnification would aid in inducing "responsible business men to accept post of
directors." Id.
Indeed, in 1986 a rash of corporate director resignations and refusals to serve on
boards was attributed to "[c]oncem[s] about increasing legal hassles.. . ." Laurie
Baum & John A. Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants: Outside Directors Find that the Risks
and Hassles Just Aren't Worth It, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56.
More recently, some Silicon Valley corporate directors expressed that they may
resign their positions if California voters approved Proposition 211. The legislation
included provisions that would have held directors liable, while simultaneously
prohibiting their corporate employers from indemnifying them in some class action
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intracorporate disputes arise between executive employees and the
corporation as to whether the employee's conduct has met statutory or
contractual thresholds that entitle the employee to indemnification. 5
As the expenses of litigating corporate director and officer claims
continue to rise, 6 public corporations7 should utilize arbitrations to settle
director and officer indemnification disputes to offset some of the
increasing costs. Public corporations' use of arbitration in indemnification
disputes would be consistent with the evolving history of using methods of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to decide intracorporate conflicts. 9
suits. See Ted Pincus, Rule of Law: Pass Proposition 211 and Watch the Market Fall,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1996, at A23.
5 See, e.g., Mayer v. Executive Telecard, Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 5403 (BSJ), 1997 WL
16669 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1997).
6 The average cost of defending director and officer claims is over $900,000. The
actual cost is even more substantial because significant costs are absorbed by in-house
counsel also involved in defending the claims. See WATSON WYATT, D & 0 LIABILrrY
SURvEY REPORT 48 (1995).
7 Public corporations can be contrasted with close corporations. There are four
basic differences between public corporations and closely held corporations: (1) public
corporations often have a large number of shareholders with no relationship to each
other besides their ownership shares in the corporation, while close corporations are
generally controlled by small, tightly knit groups of investors or owners; (2) public
corporations have limited participation by the shareholders, but rely on active,
specialized management by business executives, while close corporation investors or
owners actively participate in management; (3) public corporation investors are
concerned about receiving a return on their investment through appreciation of their
stock, while close corporation participants often rely on the corporation as a primary
means of support through either salaries or dividend payments; (4) public corporations
participate in public trading markets which allow shareholders to easily transfer their
shares. Close corporations do not have publicly traded shares and sometimes have
contractual agreements among the investors or owners to limit the transfer of shares.
See LEwIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALMITER, CoRORATIONs: EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS § 15.1 at 206 (2d ed. 1994).
8 Arbitration is a private dispute resolution procedure that typically includes all of
the essential elements of court adjudication except pretrial discovery. Most private
arbitration provides for joint selection of arbitrators, objective standards for arbitrators
to base their decisions upon and procedural rules to be applied by the arbitrators. See
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PROCESSES 199-200 (2d ed. 1992).
9 Public corporations have historically relied heavily on arbitration in resolving
labor relations disputes. One commentator estimates that from 1961 to 1962, 94% of all
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Part HI of this Note presents a brief overview of director and officer
indemnification, as well as the problems that arise by resolving these
conflicts through litigation. Part H of this Note discusses the further
judicial acceptance and expansion of ADR in intracorporate disputes as
recently evidenced by a federal court in the case of In re Salomon Inc.
Shareholders' Derivative Litigation.'0 Part IV of this Note illustrates how
corporations may adopt arbitration provisions for indemnification disputes
with their executives through bylaw or charter amendments, or through
contractual indemnity agreements. Part V discusses the benefits of
arbitrating director and officer indemnification disputes over litigating such
conflicts. Part VI of this Note provides a model indemnification-arbitration
provision. Part VII of this Note concludes that under the analysis of the
Salomon court, indemnification-arbitration provisions would be enforced by
courts and should be utilized by public corporations.
II. CORPORATE OFFICER & DIRECTOR INDEMNIFICATION
Since the 1940s and the 1950s, courts have recognized the importance
of corporations protecting their executives from personal liability for the
discharge of their corporate offices." Following judicial recognition and
acceptance of a public policy favoring corporate director and officer
indemnification, both corporations and their executives increasingly sought
to utilize the shelter provided by corporate indemnification as a critical
element of effective corporate management. 12
collective bargaining agreements between corporations and organized labor contained
some type of arbitration clause. See David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REv. 663, 747 (1973).
In the late 1980s, publicly owned security brokers began to dramatically increase
the use of arbitration in customer disputes. The National Association of Securities
Dealers reported that more than 4000 arbitration cases were filed in 1988, compared
with 2886 cases being filed in 1987. See Business Bulletin, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22,
1988, at Al.
10 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,454 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1994).
11 See, e.g., Solimine v. Hollander, 19 A.2d 344 (N.J. Ch. 1941); In re E.C.
Warner Co., 45 N.W.2d 388, 393 (linn. 1950) (finding that reimbursement of legal
expenses for corporate officials is necessary for the purpose of establishing a "sound
public policy favorable to the development of sound corporate management as a
prerequisite for responsible corporate action").
12 See Joseph P. Monteleone & Nicholas J. Conca, Directors and Officers
Indemn~fcation and Liability Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues, 51
Bus. LAw. 573, 574 (1996). "[C]ourts began to realize that a key ingredient to effective
corporate management was the protection of corporate officials from personal liability.
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The indemnification of directors and officers is an important element in
corporate culture and continues to flourish as accepted public policy.
Indeed, since New York enacted the first director and officer
indemnification statute in 1941, all fifty states, as well as Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands, have approved indemnification statutes. 13 One court has
stated that these statutes were important "to assure corporate officials that
they will not be hampered by financial constraints in mounting a full
defense against unjustified suits." 14
State indemnification statutes vary in many respects. Some state
provisions require indemnification only when the executive is "wholly
successful" on the merits, 15 while other statutes require indemnification
only to the extent that the executive "has been successful on the merits."16
In addition to variances as to when executives receive indemnification,
statutes vary regarding the types of legal proceedings that require
indemnification and the amounts for which executives may be
indemnified. 17
Although state indemnification statutes differ, they can broadly be
categorized as providing two types of indemnification---mandatory and
permissive. 18  Mandatory indemnification requires that corporations
reimburse the indemnified parties when they are successful in defending
proceedings brought against them. 19 Permissive indemnification refers to
Accordingly, corporate officials vigorously began to pursue the protection of corporate
indemnification and corporations responded by seeking the power to indemnify their
directors and officers." Id.
13 See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 4, at 283. Not only have all 50 states
enacted director and officer indemnification provisions, but since the 1980s some states
have amended their indemnification statutes to "liberalize and expand" director and
officer indemnification. Id.
14 McLean v. International Harvester Co., 902 F.2d 372, 375 (5th Cir. 1990).
15 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-52 (1990).
16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1991). This statutory language has been
interpreted as requiring indemnification for sccessful claims, even if the executive was
unsuccessful in defending other claims. See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 12, at
576.
17 See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 12, at 577-580.
For a complete inspection of all state statutory variances, see KNEPPER & BAILEY,
supra note 2.
18 See Monteleone & Conca, supra note 12, at 574-575.
19 See id. at 575-576.
202
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situations where the corporation is not required to provide indemnity, but
may exercise the power to indemnify. 20
Even with the extensive statutory guidance, as well as corporations'
assimilation of indemnification provisions into their bylaws or executive
employment agreements, 2' disputes often arise between executives and
their corporate employers regarding their right to be indemnified. 22 A
representative intracorporate indemnification dispute arose in the recent
case of Mayer v. Executive Telecard, Ltd.2 3 Theodore .Mayer, the former
corporate treasurer of Executive Telecard, Ltd., sought indemnification for
attorney's fees and other expenses he had incurred in defending an action
brought against him in his corporate capacity. 24 Executive Telecard refused
to provide indemnification because it did not believe Mayer had been
successful on the merits in the underlying claim. 25 Mayer was then forced
to sue the corporation in order to obtain indemnification for the costs he
incurred in defending the claim against him. 26
Indemnification litigation between corporations and their executive
employees costs the corporation both time and money that could likely be
saved by submitting these conflicts to arbitration. 27 Further, intracorporate
20 See id. at 576.
21 See 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 4, at 627-633.
22 See, e.g., Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that all
Delaware corporations must comply with state statutory provisions regarding mandatory
indemnification); Sequa Corp. v. Gelmin, 828 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(discussing a former executive suing corporation to receive advances for litigation
expenses incurred in defending the corporation's civil, Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) and state claims against him); Dalany v. American Pac.
Holding Corp., 42 Cal. App. 4th 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (seeking judicial
determination of whether executives had been successful on the merits in their claim and
thus entitled to indemnification); Plate v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 225 Cal.
App. 3d 1115 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that employees failed to secure
indemnification for a judgment obtained against them for inducing the corporation to
breach its commodities brokerage contract); Kaufman v. CBS, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 620
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987) (attempting unsuccissfully to receive indemnification for federal
employment discrimination claims).
23 No. 95 Civ. 5403 (BSJ), 1997 WL 16669 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1997).
24 See id. at *1.
25 See id. at *2.
2 6 See id. at *3.
2 7 See G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REv.
517, 521 (1989). "Arbitration is generally thought to be cheaper, faster, and more
flexible than litigation as a means of resolving commercial disputes." Id.
Further, the simplest securities civil case often takes up to four years to resolve
through litigation. In comparison, according to the Securities Industry Council on
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indemnification disputes swallow energy and resources resulting in direct
opposition to the general objectives of a corporation to conduct business
activities "with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain." 2 8
A great deal is at stake in determining either the right to
indemnification or the absence of a corporate obligation to indemnify
because of the enormous costs of defending claims brought against
corporate officers and directors.29 Claims against directors and officers will
likely continue to arise,30 but some of the burden of the costs of these
actions borne by the corporation, 31 and inevitably by the shareholders,
could be eased by submitting intracorporate disputes regarding director and
officer indemnification rights to arbitration.
Litigating indemnification disputes also places a tremendous burden on
executives. While waiting for judicial determinations as to their right to be
indemnified, their legal costs and other expenses involved in defending
claims against them will continue to mount. Thus, the executive is in a
situation similar to an executive who is covered by an indemnification
insurance policy that does not provide for the advancement of defense
expenses-he is forced to initially support a defense with personal
resources.
32
Arbitration, most securities disputes submitted to arbitration are disposed of in the same
year they are filed. See G. Richard Shell, Keep Broker-Client Disputes Out of Court,
WALL ST. J., March 3, 1987, at BI.
28 Tim AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES op CORPORATE GovERNANcE:
ANALYsIs & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a), at 69 (Proposed Final Draft March 31,
1992).
29 See WATSON WYATT, supra note 6, at 48.
30 See id. at 42.
31 Corporations do not usually directly pay indemnification expenses, but they often
provide insurance to cover the costs. All 50 states expressly allow corporations to
purchase director and officer indemnification insurance to cover the expenses of claims.
See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 2, at 497-499. For an extensive discussion of
director and officer indemnification insurance, see Block et al., supra note 3, at 430-
482. See also 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 4, at 335-385.
32 Indemnification insurance that does not provide for advancement of expenses is
problematic for the insured executive. "Where defense expenses reach the hundreds of
thousands of dollars, and perhaps millions of dollars, it creates a tremendous financial
strain upon an insured to have to pay these expenses and then await reimbursement from
the insurer." Monteleone & Conca, supra note 12, at 595.
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Ill. INRE SALOMON INC. SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
Courts are willing to enforce arbitration provisions to settle disputes in
legal areas where ADR is a novelty. Salomon is an example of the
continued expanding judicial acceptance of utilizing arbitration to resolve
disputes that have traditionally been the exclusive domain of full-scale
litigation. 33 The case represents the judiciary's initial approval of
arbitration as an alternative to litigation in resolving a public shareholder
derivative suit.34
In the fall of 1991, Salomon Inc. disclosed that its subsidiary, Salomon
Brothers Inc., violated federal securities laws in two ways. Salomon
Brothers had done the following: (1) bid for and acquired United States
debt securities issued at a Treasury Department auction in excess of the
thirty-five percent limitation set by the Treasury; and (2) certain Salomon
and Salomon Brothers senior executives had known of the Treasury
Department auction misconduct, but failed to report the incident to the
appropriate regulatory authority, and took no action to discipline the
employees responsible for the bidding misconduct or to prevent future
bidding violations. 35
A group of Salomon shareholders brought a derivative action against
several directors and officers,36 and one Salomon employee. 37 The
derivative shareholder plaintiffs sought to recover at least $326,200,000 on
claims that included assertions that the individual defendants had violated
securities laws, broken bidding rules and regulations of the Treasury
Department and Federal Reserve, and that Gutfreund, Strauss and
Meriwether had breached their fiduciary duties in their capacities as
corporate officers and directors. 38
33 See Jeffrey A. Sanborn, Note, The Rise of "Shareholder Derivative Arbitration"
in Public Corporations: In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation, 31
WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 337, 337 (1996).
34See id. Shareholder derivative actions are the primary means for shareholders to
hold corporate officers and directors accountable for fiduciary duties. Typically, the
shareholders, who are the derivative suit plaintiffs, sue on behalf of the corporation to
enforce the corporation's rights. The corporation itself is an indispensable party in a
derivative action and is made a nominal defendant. See SOLOMON & PALMrrER, supra
note 7, §§ 31.1-31.1.1, at 479-480.
35 See Salomon, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98, 454, at 91,116.
36 John H. Gutfreund and Thomas W. Strauss served as directors of both Salomon
and Salomon Brothers. John Meriwether was a director for Salomon Brothers. See id.
37 Paul Mozer was the Salomon employee who allegedly participated in the bidding
misconduct. See id.
38 See id. at 91,116.
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The individual defendants sought to compel arbitration of the claims
under the constitution and rules of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). 39 The district court concluded that Salomon Brothers and each of
the individual defendants were either covered members or allied members
of the NYSE,40 and had executed written agreements to abide by the
constitution and rules of the NYSE, including provisions regarding
arbitration. 41 With regard to arbitration, Article XI, section 1 of the NYSE
Constitution provides in relevant part that:
Any controversy between parties who are members, allied members or
member organizations and any controversy between a member, allied
member or member organization and any other person arising out of the
business of such member, allied member or member
organization. . . shall at the instance of any such party be submitted for
arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and
[NYSE rules].42
Further, Rule 347 of the NYSE provides that:
Any controversy between a registered representative and any member or
member organization arising out of the employment or termination of
employment of such registered representative by and with such member or
member organization shall be settled by arbitration, at the instance of any
such party, in accordance with the arbitration procedure prescribed
elsewhere in these rules. 43
The Salomon court found that these NYSE provisions, when considered
against the backdrop of a strong federal policy favoring arbitration
embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 44 were reason to grant the
individual defendants' motion to compel arbitration. 45
39 See Salomon, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,454, at 91,115-91,116.
40 Salomon was not a member of the NYSE, nor had the corporation executed any
written agreement to abide by the NYSE's constitution or rules. However, the court
found that Salomon was also bound by the NYSE provisions regarding arbitration
because it was sufficiently "thoroughly enmeshed in the underlying dispute in the case at
hand... ." Id. at 91,119.
41 See id. at 91,117.
42 Id. (alterations in original).
43 Id.
44 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1982).
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The court further found that the following two elements were
determinative of whether a claim should be submitted to arbitration: (1)
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes; and (2) whether there were
legal constraints external to the parties' agreement that should foreclose
arbitration.46
On its face, the court's conclusion in Salomon does not appear to be
extraordinary considering the clear language of Article XI, section 1 of the
NYSE Constitution, NYSE Rule 347 and the FAA. However, the court's
determination that shareholder derivative actions did not present situations
in which arbitration agreements should be foreclosed because of external
legal constraints is an important development in the further acceptance of
arbitration to resolve intracorporate disputes of public corporations. 47
A. Arbitration in Public Corporation Shareholder Derivative
Litigation
Arbitration has historically been viewed as an unacceptable means of
resolving public shareholder derivative claims because of the legal theory
relating to the necessity of the states maintaining control over large
corporations. 48 The ability of shareholders to bring derivative suits against
corporate directors and officers to exert corporate rights, and to resolve
these claims through the judicial process, has an important position in
The district court found several important provisions of the FAA relevant to the
disposition of Salomon. See Salomon, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,454, at 91,117-
91,118.
The court recognized that the purpose of the FAA was to treat agreements to
arbitrate with the same validity and force as other contracts:
The FAA accomplished this purpose by providing that arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA also
provides that a court must stay its proceedings if it is satisfied that an issue before
it is arbitrable under the agreement, § 3 [sic]; and it authorizes a federal district
court to issue an order'compelling arbitration if there has been a 'failure, neglect,
or refusal' to comply with the arbitration agreement, § 4 [sic].
Id. at 91,117 (alterations in original).
45 See id. at 91,123.
46 See id. at 91,118.
47 See generally Sanborn, supra note 33.
48 See Shell, supra note 27, at 534.
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corporate governance. 49 Shareholder derivative actions allow the judiciary
to develop corporate rules of law that are effective in the regulation of both
public corporations and their executives. 50 Therefore, the idea has been that
public shareholder derivative actions need judicial resolution to continue
the development of corporate management duties. 51
In addition to the concern that the judicial process was necessary in
public derivative suits to further develop management duties, arbitration of
these claims has traditionally been rejected because of a reluctance to bind
public shareholders to an arbitration agreement contained in either the
corporation's charter or even its shareholder agreement. 52 The troubling
question has been whether an arbitration provision regarding derivative
claims, or any other intracorporate claim, contained in a corporation's
charter would constitute a binding contract on shareholders under the
FAA. 53
49 See id. In addition to derivative claims, shareholders in public corporations also
have the capacity to vote in corporate elections to influence management decisions.
However, some believe that the idea of corporate democracy that is created by
shareholder voting is a myth because public shareholders are a dispersed group and
therefore have a difficult time combining their votes in an effective way. See id. at 536.
50 See id. Public shareholder derivative actions are often brought to recover for
alleged director and officer breaches of their fiduciary duty of care or duty of loyalty.
"Virtually the only source of cases that give operational meaning to these fiduciary
standards are judicial opinions rendered in response to shareholder lawsuits against
management." Id. at 537-538.
51 See id. at 541. In addition to the desire to further management duties by using
the judicial forum to resolve public shareholder derivative claims, several other factors
historically appeared to make arbitration of derivative claims an impossibility.
Derivative actions often include allegations of violations of federal securities laws, and
until 1987, arbitrators had no authority with regard to these claims. Also, prior to 1984,
state courts applied state statutory rules to arbitration agreements, and all state
arbitration laws relating to corporate governance were limited to close corporations.
Finally, state statutes that govern derivative actions require judicial approval of any
settlement or dismissal. See id. at n. 151 (citations omitted).
52 See id. at 544-551. The judicial forum and contract concerns are not the only
traditional problems with the arbitration of derivative claims, but they are of primary
importance with relation to this Note. For more complete discussions of arbitration and
derivative actions see John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 919
(1988); Sanborn, supra note 33; Shell, supra note 27
53 See Shell, supra note 27, at 544-551.
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Even if one concedes that an arbitration agreement in a corporation's
charter is indeed a binding contract provision, there remains the issue of
the shareholders' acceptance of the provision through their purchase of
stock.54 Membership as a shareholder in a public corporation is unlike
other memberships because public shareholders do not share professional,
personal or religious interests that would imply their willingness to be
subject to the organizational norms that accompany their membership. It is
difficult to infer the consent of literally millions of public shareholders to an
arbitration provision solely because they have all decided to purchase the
same stock. 55
The passive nature of public stock ownership ensures that many
shareholders will be unaware of any arbitration provision when they
purchase their shares. Further, arbitration provisions have not been widely
used in resolving public corporation shareholder disputes. 56 These two
issues, combined with the perceived superior bargaining power of the
corporation to amend corporate charters, may create the requisite adhesion,
surprise and disparate bargaining power that could yield an arbitration
provision unconscionable under contract law. 57
The district court in Salomon considered both the need for judicial
determinations in public derivative claims and the effect of binding public
shareholders to arms-length arbitration provisions, and concluded that
arbitration was an acceptable and agreed-upon mechanism for resolving the
shareholder derivative claims at bar.5 8
54 See id. at 547.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 549.
57 See id. If an agreement to arbitrate is unconscionable, it is not subject to the
realm of the FAA. "An agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
58 See Salomon, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,454, at 91,123.
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1. Need for Judicial Determination
The Salomon court recognized the traditional sound public policy
disfavoring the arbitration of public shareholder derivative suits.59
However, the court reasoned that under the FAA and a United States
Supreme Court ruling, it was required to enforce an arbitration agreement
between the parties absent some Congressional intent to preclude a cause of
action from alternative means of dispute resolution.60
The court considered, and rejected, the argument that Congress had
intended to preclude the waiver of judicial remedy in shareholder derivative
actions by promulgating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.61 Rule 23.1
provides in pertinent part that "[derivative actions] shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders.., in such manner
as the court directs." 62
The court found that Rule 23.1 is not a statute enacted by Congress
requiring judicial involvement in shareholder derivative disputes, but is
instead a procedural right and duty that is binding upon the courts.
However, the court is forced to yield to substantive statutory rights such as
those embodied in the FAA. 63
Thus, even though it harbored "considerable doubt as to the suitability
of arbitration" in shareholder derivative actions, the court correctly
59 See id. at 91,119-91,120. "Courts have long recognized the importance of the
shareholders' derivative form of action as a means of ensuring corporate management in
the interests of the shareholders and redressing abuses of trust by corporate officers and
directors." Id. See also supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
60 See Salomon, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,454, at 91,120. The court cited
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985),
which stated that:
j]ust as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act that
requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements covered by
that Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some other statute on which
the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to which agreements to
arbitrate will be held unenforceable.
Salomon, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 98,454, at 91,120 (emphasis added by the court).
61 See Salomon, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,454, at 91,120-91,121.
62 FED. R. CIv. P. 23.1.
63 See Salomon, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,454, at 91,120-91,121.
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recognized that arbitration was a favored dispute resolution mechanism and
enforced the parties' agreement. 64
2. Binding Shareholders to NYSE Arbitration Provisions
The district court found that the shareholder plaintiffs in a derivative
action were indeed obligated by the arbitration provisions that bound the
corporation. 65 The court reasoned that in -derivative actions the
shareholders' claims are not actually theirs, but are instead the claims of
the corporation. 66
Derivative shareholder plaintiffs assume the rights of the corporation.
Thus, those sued by a shareholder plaintiff may utilize all defenses or
procedures they could utilize against the corporation. 67 The Salomon court
found that the shareholders who brought the derivative action against the
individual defendants were committed to the NYSE arbitration provisions
because the defendants chose to employ the provisions. 68
Therefore, because the corporation itself would be committed to
arbitrate the disputes at the insistence of a party under the NYSE's
Constitution and Rules, the derivative shareholders were also bound to
arbitration upon demand of the defendants.
B. Arbitration in Director and Officer Indemnification Disputes
The district court was correct to enforce the NYSE arbitration
provisions in the public shareholder derivative action involved in Salomon.
Therefore, if corporations provide for the arbitration of indemnification
disputes with their executives, courts should enforce those agreements.
64 Id. at 91,121. The court quoted the United States Supreme Court that "any doubt
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Id.
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1982)).
65 See id. at 91,118.
66 See id. "It is well established that a 'claim pressed by the stockholder against
directors or third parties is not his (or her) own but the corporation's.'" Id. (quoting
Ross v. Benard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)).
67 See id.
68 See id. at 91,118-91,119.
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1. No External Legal Constraints Preclude Arbitration of
Indemnification Disputes
Intracorporate director and officer indemnification disputes provide less
challenging concerns regarding public policy and external legal constraints
than do public shareholder derivative actions. 69 Indemnification disputes
can be resolved through arbitration, yet still allow for judicial conclusions
with regard to executive standards and duties through the underlying action
for which the executive seeks indemnification. Thus, even if the parties
agree to exclude the judiciary from determining the executive's right to
indemnification, corporate duties may continue to be further defined by
courts through resolution of the original action that caused the director to
become a party in need of indemnification.
The United States Supreme Court has held that under the FAA,
agreements to arbitrate should be enforced according to the agreement of
the parties unless Congress has acted to require judicial adjudication of a
claim.70 The Salomon court considered the effect that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1 may have in precluding the arbitration of derivative
actions, and decided that the Rule does not forbid the arbitration of such
claims. 71
Agreements to arbitrate intracorporate indemnification disputes would
survive similar scrutiny to determine whether Congress has acted to
preclude the arbitration of the claims because to date Congress has acted in
no way to limit the means of resolving indemnification disputes.
69 See supra notes 48-68 and accompanying text.
70 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985) (finding that a claim is nonarbitrable only when "Congress itself has evinced
an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue").
The Court has not shied away from its commitment to arbitration, but has further
embraced it. In a 1995 case, the Court allowed a plaintiff to recover punitive damages
from a securities broker based on the parties' client agreement arbitration provision,
even though New York law precludes arbitrators from granting punitive damages. See
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58-64 (1995). The Court
found that its ruling was "consistent with the central purpose of the Federal Arbitration
Act to ensure 'that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their
terms.'" Id. at 53-54 (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
71 See Salomon, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 98,454, at 91,120-91,121.
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Therefore, because the Salomon court found that there were no legal
constraints external to the parties' agreement to arbitrate that would
foreclose arbitration in public corporation derivative actions, it would be
legally acceptable for courts to enforce intracorporate indemnification
arbitration agreements.72
2. Indemnification Arbitration Agreements Would Present No
Contractual Problems73
In Salomon, the district court found a valid agreement to arbitrate
disputes based on the NYSE Constitution Article XI, section 1 and Rule
347.74 The derivative plaintiff shareholders were held to these provisions
because the court found that the plaintiffs stood in the shoes of Salomon
and Salomon Brothers, who would as members of the NYSE be obligated
to arbitrate under the NYSE Rules. 75 The court bound the derivative
shareholders despite historical concerns regarding the conscionability of
enforcing broad corporate provisions against vastly dispersed
shareholders. 76
The executives who would be parties to an intracorporate
indemnification arbitration agreement are even more attractive and
acceptable candidates to be bound by corporate contractual provisions than
public corporation derivative shareholder plaintiffs. Corporate executives
are generally highly trained and educated professionals. 77 They are often
involved in the daily operations of the corporation and exert a great deal of
influence over corporate decisions. 78 These individuals are in a much
72 See id. at 91,119-91,124.
73 For a discussion of how corporations and their executives may commit to
arbitrating indemnification disputes, see infra Part IV.
74 See Salomon, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 98,454, at 91,117-91,119.
75 See id. at 91,118.
76 See Coffee, supra note 52, at 963-967; Shell, supra note 27, at 543-549.
77 A 1985 survey revealed that 93 % of the directors of major American companies
were white males who had graduated from college. James D. Cox & Harry L.
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications
of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 106 n.107 (Summer, 1985).
The directors tended to be chief executive officers, university presidents and deans,
attorneys and former government officials. With increasing expectations for corporate
board performance, it is anticipated that corporate management will become even more
professional and specialized in the future. See Ira M. Millstein, The Professional Board,
50 Bus. LAw. 1427, 1440-1441 (1996).
78 See generally Millstein, supra note 77.
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stronger position to be aware of corporate charter provisions and corporate
dispute resolution procedures than the average public shareholder.
Because the Salomon court found that the NYSE's Constitution and
Rules were adequate to bind public shareholder plaintiffs in the derivative
action, courts should enforce agreements to arbitrate corporate
indemnification disputes because the corporate executives have a far more
intimate relationship to the corporation's organizational norms and
procedures than most shareholders.
IV. METHODS OF INCLUDING INDEMNIFICATION ARBITRATION
PROVISIONS
Corporations should assess the likelihood that their directors and
officers will be subject to claims in deciding whether it would be beneficial
to include arbitration provisions in indemnification agreements. Executives
of larger public corporations are most susceptible to suits, and it would be
more efficient and prudent for large corporations to arbitrate intracorporate
disputes regarding executive indemnification rights than to absorb the costs
of litigating these issues.79 Once a corporation has determined its needs and
the benefits of arbitrating executive indemnification disputes, there are
several methods that the corporation can utilize to employ arbitration
provisions.
A. Indemnity Agreements
Public corporations have indemnity agreements with their top
executives.8 0 These agreements determine the scope, limitations and
necessary procedures for a director or officer to receive indemnification.8'
Corporations could utilize arbitration in indemnification disputes by
including an arbitration provision in their executive indemnity agreements.
79 Directors of corporations with assets over $10 billion are far more susceptible to
claims, and are sued with far greater frequency than directors of corporations with
under $100 million in assets. See WATSON WYATr, supra note 6, at 42. Also, directors
of corporations involved in large banking, utilities, transportation and communication,
nonbanking financial services and petroleum, mining and agriculture are likely to be
sued with greater frequency than their counterparts in other business classes. See id. at
43.
80 See, e.g., 2 KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 4, at 631-633.
81 See id.
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The utilization of an arbitration provision in a corporate indemnity
agreement is consistent with the use of arbitration clauses in other corporate
executive agreements, such as restricted stock agreements and resignation
agreements.82
The First Commerce Corporation of Louisiana provides for the
arbitration of employment disputes with their executives through the
following contractual language:
Arbitration. In the event there is a dispute arising under this agreement,
the parties will submit their dispute to arbitration in New Orleans for final
resolution in accordance with the rules and procedures of the American
Arbitration Association. If [the executive] prevails, [the corporation] shall
pay all costs incurred by him as a result of the arbitration. 83
Contractual language similar to that used by First Commerce
Corporation of Louisiana could be added to executive indemnity
agreements to ensure that such disputes are resolved through arbitration
instead of settling conflicts through the costly and time consuming litigation
process.
B. Charter or Bylaw Amendments
Corporations can amend their charters or bylaws to provide for the
arbitration of indemnification disputes with their executives. 84 Courts have
found that arbitration provisions in bylaws and organizational constitutions
of private associations such as labor groups, religious groups, realty boards
and securities exchanges are binding upon members, even if the members
themselves have not signed any agreement to be bound by the
organization's rules. 85 Both corporate charters and bylaws lay valid,
contractual obligations on corporate executives. Therefore, the inclusion of
82 See Sanborn, supra note 33, at 350-351.
83 First Commerce Corp. Louisiana, SEC Form S-4 (Aug. 1, 1995) available in
WESTLAW, EDGAR database, FILING 95557951, at *495-496.
84 Corporate charters are more difficult to amend than bylaws. Unless the charter
amendment is a result of corporate reorganization, most charter amendments require the
board of directors to recommend the adoption of the amendment, as well as the approval
of shareholders. See REVISED MODEL BusINEsS CORP. Acr § 10.03 (1985). Corporate
bylaws may be amended only by approval of the board of directors. See id. § 10.20.
85 See Shell, supra note 27, at 546-547.
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an indemnification arbitration provision in these corporate governing rules
would establish an enforceable contract under the FAA.86
At least one public corporation has included an indemnification dispute
arbitration provision in its corporate bylaws.8 7 Wisconsin Energy
Corporation modified its bylaws to allow for arbitration in indemnification
conflicts by providing that the director or officer seeking indemnification
could have their right to indemnification determined by "a panel of three
(3) arbitrators consisting of one arbitrator selected by those
directors ... entitled to select independent counsel, one arbitrator selected
by the director or officer seeking indemnification and one arbitrator
selected by the two (2) arbitrators previously selected."88 Wisconsin
Energy Corporation has apparently recognized the benefits of avoiding
litigation of indemnification disputes.
More public corporations should follow the approach of Wisconsin
Energy Corporation and develop arbitration as a mechanism for settling
intracorporate indemnification claims.
V. BENEFITS OF ARBITRATING INDEMNIFICATION DISPUTES
Arbitration is thought to present three particularly distinct advantages
over the litigation of intracorporate disputes: "(1) lower cost, (2) relative
speed, and (3) expertise." 89
First, arbitration is generally thought to be less costly than full-scale
litigation. 90 The simplicity of arbitration procedures, as compared to the
86 See id. at 552. "[The individuals who govern the corporation... should be
bound by any dispute resolution system provided for in the charter just as they must
honor any charter rules determining the number of seats on the board, voting
requirements for removal of directors, or other basic governance matters." Id.
87 See Sanborn, supra note 33, at 353.
88 Wisconsin Energy Corp., SEC Form S-4 (Aug. 7, 1995), available in
WESTLAW, EDGAR database, FILING 95559416 at *364-365. Wisconsin Energy
Corporation's directors and officers are not required to arbitrate indemnification
disputes but may instead opt to have their right to indemnification determined by (1) a
majority vote of the Board of Directors who are not parties to the proceedings, or a
committee appointed by the Board of Directors; (2) independent counsel selected by the
Board of Directors or a selection committee; or (3) a vote of shareholders who are not
parties to the underlying action. See id.
89 Coffee, supra note 52, at 957.
90 See GOLDBERG Er AL., supra note 8, at 200.
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complexity of trials and especially pre-trial discovery, 91 would save money
that could be directed toward the general corporate goal of increasing
shareholder profits. 92
Arbitration is also considered to be a more speedy method of resolving
disputes than litigation. 93 Faster resolution of indemnification fights would
allow for the corporate directors and officers to expeditiously continue with
the defense of the claims brought against them. If the indemnification
determination can be made in a timely fashion, then the underlying claim
will inevitably be closed in shorter course. Resolving the entire matter as
quickly as possible would again derivatively serve the best interests of the
shareholders by allowing corporate managers to focus their energies on the
corporate operations instead of defending personal claims.
Another benefit of arbitration is that the arbitrators are likely to have
more expertise than a court. 94 This benefit is even more likely to be present
in a highly specialized area of law, such as director and officer
indemnification. 95 Indeed, it is unlikely that outside the state of Delaware,
the courts would have better expertise at determining matters involving
corporate governance than arbitrators selected by the parties. 96 The
American Arbitration Association (AAA)97 is particularly skilled and
experienced in handling complex corporate disputes. 98 The AAA has
adopted special rules for handling complex securities matters that allow for
the efficient and economical resolution of disputes with claims in excess of
$1,000,000. 99 In its quick response to the rush of securities arbitration, the
91 See id.
92 See AMERICAN LAW INSITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a), at 69 (Proposed Final Draft March 31,
1992).
93 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 200.
94 See id.
95 See Coffee, supra note 52, at 957.
96 See id.
97 The AAA is a public service, nonprofit organization that was founded in 1926 to
encourage the use of arbitration and other ADR mechanisms. It provides education,
training and research on ADR, and assists industries in designing their own ADR
systems. See ROBERT COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNow 8
(Rev. 5th ed. 1993).
98 See Sanborn, supra note 33, at 363-364.
99 See SECURrrEs ARBrrRATION RULES 7 (American Arbitration Association 1993).
The AAA ensures that securities arbitrators are skilled and informed with regard to
current securities issues by requiring that they complete special training before
arbitrating, as well as requiring that they attend periodic refresher courses. See
AMmCAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, A GuIDE FOR SECURMTES ARBrTRATORS
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AAA has shown that it has the necessary flexibility and expertise to adapt
adequately to arbitrate corporate indemnification disputes.' 00
Corporations that adopt arbitration provisions for resolving
indemnification disputes will reap the benefits that arbitration renders over
litigation. Such benefits will eventually fall where they rightfully belong-
the shareholders' purses.
VI. PROPOSED INDEMNIFICATION LANGUAGE
An intracorporate indemnification arbitration provision should attempt
to preserve the basic function of the judicial process by providing an
expert, external monitoring body that is sufficiently distant from the
participants to render a disinterested judgment. 101 The proposed indemnity
arbitration provision below attempts to maintain such a balance. The
language is equally suitable for inclusion in an executive indemnity
agreement, or as a charter or bylaw provision.
ARBITRATION OF INDFMNLFICATION DISPUTES
(1) Any dispute between the corporation and the director or officer arising
out of or relating to the director or officer's right to indemnification, shall
be discussed between the disputing parties in a good faith effort to arrive
at a mutual settlement of any controversy. If such dispute cannot be
resolved, at the insistence of any party, the dispute shall be submitted to
binding arbitration.
(2) The director or officer seeking indemnification shall select one of the
following two (2) means for conducting arbitration to determine his or her
right to indemnification:
SERVING UNDER THm AAA's SEcuRmEs ARirrRATION RULES, 1993 WL 495389, at *2
(1993). Further, the AAA has implemented a Large Complex Case Project that utilizes
a limited panel of highly qualified and trained arbitrators, special procedural rules and
administration by senior AAA staff. See id. at *3.
100 The United States Supreme Court first approved arbitration of securities
disputes in 1987. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987).
101 See Coffee, supra note 52, at 957-958.
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(a) By a panel of three (3) arbitrators consisting of one arbitrator
selected by a quorum of those directors who are not parties to the
same or related proceedings, one arbitrator selected by the
director or officer seeking indemnification and one arbitrator
selected by the two (2) arbitrators previously selected; or
(b) By submission of the dispute to arbitration in the jurisdiction
of incorporation for resolution in accordance with the rules and
procedures of the American Arbitration Association.102
Section 1 of the proposed indemnity arbitration provision attempts to
ensure that the dispute between the party seeking indemnification and the
corporation cannot be resolved through mutual agreement before requiring
extracorporate involvement. The section attempts to conserve even the time
and money that will be consumed if the parties avoid litigation and agree to
arbitrate the dispute. Section 1 also recognizes the effectiveness of
negotiation as a means of settling disputes and attempts to force a dialogue
that may adequately resolve the conflict. 103
Section 2 of the proposed provision provides the party seeking
indemnification a choice of arbitrator selection procedures. The executive
may either choose to directly participate in the selection, or allow the AAA
to provide arbitrators through their usual process. 104 Section 2 attempts to
ensure that the most vulnerable party in a corporate indemnification
dispute, the party seeking indemnification, maintains some command over
the external decisionmaking body. This provision is needed to balance the
strength that the proposal affords the corporate entity by permitting it to
initiate the arbitration, even if the executive pursuing indemnification
would prefer to litigate the matter.
102 This model provision combines elements of Article XI, § 1 of the NYSE
Constitution, Wisconsin Energy Corporation's indemnification arbitration provision and
Ciprico, Inc.'s restricted stock arbitration provision. See Ciprico, Inc., SEC Form 10-Q
(June 30, 1995) available in WESTLAW, EDGAR database, FILING 95559749, at
*40-41.
103 Negotiation is the primary means of resolving disputes. "Ninety-five percent of
cases filed in court are resolved without a trial. Most disputes are never filed in court;
instead, lawyers and business executives constantly negotiate." CouLsON, supra note
97, at 13.
104 If parties have not agreed upon arbitrators when a dispute is submitted to the
AAA, the organization will prepare a list of proposed arbitrators based on the nature of
the dispute. Each party has 10 days to raise objections to particular arbitrator
candidates, and then the AAA selects mutually acceptable choices. See id. at 18-19.
The AAA maintains more than 55,000 neutral business experts who may serve as
arbitrators. See id. at 15.
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The above-proposed indemnity-arbitration provision, or other similar
language, will preserve the basic functions of the judiciary in litigation.10 5
It will provide an expert, external monitoring body that is distant enough
from the parties to render a fair judgment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the reasoning of the district court in Salomon,
indemnification-arbitration provisions would be enforceable under the
FAA's two part test. First, either through an arbitration provision in
executive indemnity agreements or through charter or bylaw amendments,
the corporation and its directors and officers would have agreed to arbitrate
indemnification disputes. Further, there is an absence of external legal
constraints that would prevent the arbitration of indemnification disputes.
Therefore, public corporations should adopt provisions to arbitrate
indemnification disputes in an effort to save time and money and fulfill the
general corporate goal of increasing shareholder profits.10 6
105 Drafters of director and officer indemnification provisions should be aware that
in a dispute, whatever contract provisions are omitted from their arbitration agreements
will be filled by either local laws or rules of arbitration associations. See KNEPPER &
BAILEY, supra note 2, at 329.
The drafters should always be careful to consider provisions relating to:
how jurisdictional disputes shall be determined, what relief may be granted by the
arbitrator, the nature and extent of discovery to be permitted in the arbitration
proceedings, whether any form of injunctive relief may be granted during the
pendency of the proceedings, whether the arbitrator may award punitive damage
and any limitations or guidelines as the determination of compensatory damages.
Id. at 329-330.106 See AMERiCAN LAW INSTmE, PRINCIPLES OF COR'ORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATONS § 2.01(a), at 69 (Proposed Final Draft March 31,
1992).
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